发布时间 : 2024/7/7 0:36:41 星期日 文章From Pigou to extended liability - on the optimal taxation of externalities under imperfect更新完毕开始阅读4a0f02cc76c66137ef0619c5

I+m?Ay)no?nancingy)?R(bilaterallyef?cientcut-off

yFigure2

ForA≥A1,thebilaterallye?cientcut-o?

y).WhenA

fallstoA2(

y+),though,nomoreconcessionscanraisethepledgeableincome

andtheinvestmentcannolongerbe?nanced.

WhenA

y∈[w+τ?f,

y.

Discussion:natureofexternalityandroleofmonitoring.

Inthismodel,theexternalityexertedbytheinvestors-entrepreneurcoalitionrelatestothechoiceofthelayo?threshold

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Theexternalityisherelinkedtothechoiceofcontinuation,e.g.,ofhowmuchliquiditytheen-

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Itisalsoworthcommentingontheroleofmonitoring.Inthisbasicmodel,monitoringbyanintermediaryallowsinvestorstorecoupincomeingoodstatesofnature.Ittherebyharnessesthe?rm’scontributivecapabilityandallowsthe?rmto(indirectly,throughinvestors)payalayo?taxinbadstatesofnature.Thisisobviouslyanimportantaspectofmonitoring.Anotherimportantaspectconsistsforthemonitorinexertinghercontrolrightssoastochangethedistributionofincome;alternativelythemonitormaya?ectwhathappenstotheworkerincaseoflayo?:Byprovidingon-the-jobgeneralisttrainingorbymakingitsemployeesmoreconnectedandvisibletotheoutside,the?rmcanreducethelengthofunemployment(whichisequivalenttoincreasingbinthismodel).20Monitorsthuscanexercisetheircontrolrightstoeitherreducetheprobabilityofbankruptcy/layo?ortoimprovethesakeoflaid-o?workers.AsSection3.4howeverwillshow,ouranalysisfullycarriesovertothisotherdimensionofmonitoring,showingthatthereisnosub-stantivedi?erencebetweenthe“contributive-capability-enhancement”andthe“ex-anteintervention”viewsofmonitoring.

2.2Examples

Example1(stealingorincentivepayment):Supposethattheentrepreneurcanstealafractionβofrealizedincome.Equivalently,βycouldbeassociatedwithanincentivepaymentaimedatpreventingtheentrepreneurfromtaking(output-contingent)privatebene?ts.Then

R(y,

entrepreneurfromstealingtheentireoutput.21

Example2(perksandprestigefromo?ce):Supposethattheentrepreneurenjoysnon-monetaryprivatebene?tBfrombeingino?ce.22Then

R(y,

y}.y}.

Themonitoringcostcaninthisexamplebeviewedasacostrequiredtopreventthe

Inamilderversion,theentrepreneur’sprivatebene?twoulddependonthe?rm’sscaleorlaborforce,bringingExample2closertoExample1.Examples1and2canmore

generallybecombinedas

R(y,

y},

with0≤r(y2)?r(y1)y1(less-than-unitaryincrements).InExamples1and2,N?Ristriviallysingle-peaked,with

y?)=b,

thatis:

1?β

(Example1)and

?

y?w?τ+f)g(

?

y?w?τ+f?r(y).

y+?r(

Aratherdi?erentanalysisofexpostbargainingisconductedinBlanchardandTirole(2008).There,underexpostwagebargaining(?rmsandworkersbargainoverwagesafterinvestmentshavebeensunk),anincreaseinthelayo?taxmakesiteasierforworkerstocapturesomeoftheupsidepro?t.Giventhe?rms’breakevencondition,theseupsidegainsareo?setbylowerwagesorlowerunemploymentbene?tswhenthe?rmislessproductive,destroyinginsuranceoverall.Expostwagebargainingthuscallsforless-than-fullexperiencerating.Notethatbargainingoccursbetweenthe?rmandtheworkersandthatthelatterareriskaverse.Riskaversioniskeytotheextentthatexpostwagebargainingdestroysinsurance.Herethe?rmandits?nanciersarebothriskneutral.

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trepreneur’sbargainingpower)totheentrepreneur:

Thecut-o?rule

subjectto:

?G(

R(y,yˉ)=β(y?yˉ)11{y≥

y)g(

y)).

y?=b+β

1?G(

g(

y)(μ?f)+??

1?G(y}

{G(

y))U(w)}

G(

(y?w)dG(y)≥I+m

y

??

y?w?R(y,

y

?