发布时间 : 星期二 文章克鲁格曼 国际经济学 教材答案更新完毕开始阅读acbc54dbad51f01dc281f1d8
consumption. Thus, there is a bias towards future consumption. e. The return to capital is higher than in the rest of the world (since the country's rate of growth exceeds that of the rest of the world), and there is a bias toward future consumption.
5. a. $10 million is not a controlling interest in IBM, so this does not qualify as direct foreign investment. It is international portfolio diversification.
b. This is direct foreign investment if one considers the apartment building a business which pays returns in terms of rents.
c. Unless particular U.S. shareholders will not have control over the new French company,
this will not be direct foreign investment.
d. This is not direct foreign investment since the Italian company is an \
the ones which ultimately control, the company.
6. In terms of location, the Karma company has avoided Brazilian import restrictions. In terms of internalization, the firm has retained its control over the technology by not divulging its patents.
chapter 8
1. The import demand equation, MD, is found by subtracting the home supply equation from the home demand equation. This results in MD = 80 - 40 x P. Without trade, domestic prices and quantities adjust such that import demand is zero. Thus, the price in the absence of trade is 2. 2. a. Foreign's export supply curve, XS, is XS = -40 + 40 x P. In the absence of trade, the price is 1.
b. When trade occurs export supply is equal to import demand, XS = MD. Thus, using the
equations from problems 1 and 2a, P = 1.50, and the volume of trade is 20.
3. a. The new MD curve is 80 - 40 x (P+t) where t is the specific tariff rate, equal to 0.5. (Note: in solving these problems you should be careful about whether a specific tariff or ad valorem tariff is imposed. With an ad valorem tariff, the MD equation would be expressed as MD=80-40 x(1+t)P). The equation for the export supply curve by the foreign country is unchanged. Solving, we find that the world price is $1.25, and thus the internal price at home is $1.75. The volume of trade has been reduced to 10, and the total demand for wheat at home has fallen to 65 (from the free trade level of 70). The total demand for wheat in Foreign has gone up from 50 to 55.
b. and c. The welfare of the home country is best studied using the combined numerical and
graphical solutions presented below in Figure 8-1.
PriceHome SupplyPT=1.75PW=1.50PT*=1.25abcedHome Demand50556070Quantity
where the areas in the figure are:
a: 55(1.75-1.50) -.5(55-50)(1.75-1.50)=13.125 b: .5(55-50)(1.75-1.50)=0.625 c: (65-55)(1.75-1.50)=2.50 d: .5(70-65)(1.75-1.50)=0.625 e: (65-55)(1.50-1.25)=2.50
Consumer surplus change: -(a+b+c+d)=-16.875. Producer surplus change: a=13.125. Government revenue change: c+e=5. Efficiency losses b+d are exceeded by terms of trade gain e. [Note: in the calculations for the a, b, and d areas a figure of .5 shows up. This is because we are measuring the area of a triangle, which is one-half of the area of the rectangle defined by the product of the horizontal and vertical sides.] 4. Using the same solution methodology as in problem 3, when the home country is very small relative to the foreign country, its effects on the terms of trade are expected to be much less. The small country is much more likely to be hurt by its imposition of a tariff. Indeed, this intuition is shown in this problem. The free trade equilibrium is now at the price $1.09 and the trade volume is now $36.40.
With the imposition of a tariff of 0.5 by Home, the new world price is $1.045, the internal home price is $1.545, home demand is 69.10 units, home supply is 50.90 and the volume of trade is 18.20. When Home is relatively small, the effect of a tariff on world price is smaller than when Home is relatively large. When Foreign and Home were closer in size, a tariff of .5 by home lowered world price by 25 percent, whereas in this case the same tariff lowers world price by about 5 percent. The internal Home price is now closer to the free trade price plus t than when Home was relatively large. In this case, the government revenues from the tariff equal 9.10, the consumer surplus loss is 33.51, and the producer surplus gain is 21.089. The distortionary losses associated with the tariff (areas b+d) sum to 4.14 and the terms of trade gain (e) is 0.819. Clearly, in this small country example the distortionary losses from the tariff swamp the terms of trade gains. The general lesson is the smaller the economy, the larger the losses from a tariff since the terms of trade gains are smaller. 5. The effective rate of protection takes into consideration the costs of imported intermediate goods. In this example, half of the cost of an aircraft represents components purchased from other countries. Without the subsidy the aircraft would cost $60 million. The European value added to the aircraft is $30 million. The subsidy cuts the cost of the value added to purchasers of the airplane to $20 million. Thus, the effective rate of protection is (30 - 20)/20 = 50%. 6. We first use the foreign export supply and domestic import demand curves to determine the new world price. The foreign supply of exports curve, with a foreign subsidy of 50 percent per unit, becomes XS = -40 + 40(1+0.5) x P. The equilibrium world price is 1.2 and the internal foreign price is 1.8. The volume of trade is 32. The foreign demand and supply curves are used to determine the costs and benefits of the subsidy. Construct a diagram similar to that in the text and calculate the area of the various polygons. The government must provide (1.8 - 1.2) x 32 = 19.2 units of output to support the subsidy. Foreign producers surplus rises due to the subsidy by the amount of 15.3 units of output. Foreign consumers surplus falls due to the higher price by 7.5 units of the good. Thus, the net loss to Foreign due to the subsidy is 7.5 + 19.2 - 15.3 = 11.4 units of output. Home consumers and producers face an internal price of 1.2 as a result of the
subsidy. Home consumers surplus rises by 70 x .3 + .5 (6 x.3) = 21.9 while Home producers surplus falls by 44 x .3 + .5(6 x .3) = 14.1, for a net gain of 7.8 units of output.
7. At a price of $10 per bag of peanuts, Acirema imports 200 bags of peanuts. A quota limiting the import of peanuts to 50 bags has the following effects: a. The price of peanuts rises to $20 per bag. b. The quota rents are ($20 - $10) x 50 = $500.
c. The consumption distortion loss is .5 x 100 bags x $10 per bag = $500. d. The production distortion loss is .5 x 50 bags x $10 per bag = $250.
Chapter 9
1.
The arguments for free trade in this quote include:
? Free trade allows consumers and producers to make decisions based upon the marginal cost and benefits associated with a good when costs and prices are undistorted by government policy.
? The Philippines is \so it will have little scope for influencing world prices and capturing welfare gains through an improvement of its terms of trade.
? \the confines of a narrow domestic market\allows possible gains through economies of scale in production.
? Free trade \
? Special interests may dictate trade policy for their own ends rather than for the general welfare. Free trade policies may aid in halting corruption where these special interests exert undue or disproportionate influence on public policy.
2. a. This is potentially a valid argument for a tariff, since it is based on an assumed ability of the United States to affect world prices -- that is, it is a version of the optimal tariff argument. If the United States is concerned about higher world prices in the future, it could use policies which encourage the accumulation of oil inventories and minimize the potential for future adverse shocks.
b. Sharply falling prices benefit U.S. consumers, and since these are off-season grapes and do
not compete with the supplies from U.S. producers, the domestic producers are not hurt. There is no reason to keep a luxury good expensive.
c. The higher income of farmers due to export subsidies and the potentially higher income to
those who sell goods and services to the farmers comes at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. Unless there is some domestic market failure, an export subsidy always produces more costs than benefits. Indeed, if the goal of policy is to stimulate the demand for the associated goods and services, policies should be targeted directly at these goals. d. There may be external economies associated with the domestic production of
semiconductors. This is a potentially a valid argument. But the gains to producers of protecting the semiconductor industry must as always be weighed against the higher costs to consumers and other industries which pervasively use the chips. A well-targeted policy instrument would be a production subsidy. This has the advantage of directly dealing with the externalities associated with domestic chip production.
e. Thousands of homebuyers as consumers (as well as workers who build the homes for
which the timber was bought) have benefited from the cheaper imported timber. If the goal of policy is to soften the blow to timber workers, a more efficient policy would be
direct payments to timber workers in order to aid their relocation. 3. Without tariffs, the country produces 100 units and consumes 300 units, thus importing 200 units.
a. A tariff of 5 per unit leads to production of 125 units and consumption of 250 units. The
increase in welfare is the increase due to higher production of 25 x 10 minus the losses to consumer and producer surplus of (25 x 5)/2 and (50 x 5)/2, respectively, leading to a net gain of 62.5.
b. A production subsidy of 5 leads to a new supply curve of S = 50 + 5 x(P+5).
Consumption stays at 300, production rises to 125, and the increase in welfare equals the benefits from greater production minus the production distortion costs, 25 x 10 - (25 x 5)/2 = 187.5.
c. The production subsidy is a better targeted policy than the import tariff since it directly
affects the decisions which reflect a divergence between social and private costs while leaving other decisions unaffected. The tariff has a double-edged function as both a production subsidy and a consumption tax.
d. The best policy is to have producers fully internalize the externality by providing a subsidy
of 10 per unit. The new supply curve will then be S = 50 + 5 x(P+10), production will be 150 units, and the welfare gain from this policy will be 50 x 10 - (10 x 50)/2 =250. 4. The government's objective is to maximize consumers surplus plus its own revenue plus twice the amount of producers surplus. A tariff of 5 per unit improves producers surplus by 562.5, worsens consumers surplus by 1375, and leads to government revenue of 625. The tariff results in an increase in the government's objective function of 375. 5. The United States has a legitimate interest in the trade policies of other countries, just as other countries have a legitimate interest in U.S. activities. The reason is that uncoordinated trade policies are likely to be inferior to those based on negotiations. By negotiating with each other, governments are better able both to resist pressure from domestic interest groups and to avoid trade wars of the kind illustrated by the Prisoners' Dilemma example in the text.
6. a. While tariffs are legal, the United States is obliged to offer compensation for any unilateral tariff increase by reducing other tariffs to compensate the affected exporting country. b. Export subsidies on agricultural products are legal under GATT.
c. This is not legal under GATT because the United States is not offering compensating
reductions in other tariffs on Canadian goods. Interestingly, in the late 1980s, U.S. efforts to protect the shakes and shingles industry were met with an outcry and Canadian threats of a trade war. These protectionist efforts by the United States were rescinded. d. This is legal under GATT since the action is taken by Canada on its own exports. e. This is legal under GATT since it does not involve any direct export subsidies. f. This is legal under GATT and, in fact, may help increase the benefits from trade.
7. The potential economic costs associated with the entrance of Poland and Hungary into an expanded EU depend largely on whether their membership results in trade creation or trade diversion. In particular, Poland and Hungary will gain if they engage in new trade with Western Europe although they might lose if trade within the European Union simply replaces trade which had been occurring with Eastern bloc countries. Furthermore, both of these nations will face at least higher structural unemployment during the transition period. Some of the negative effects on workers might be lessened if labor mobility is permitted across borders.